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Harwood: Post-pandemic Posthuman Worlds

Pandemic, Human Precarity and PostPandemic Metaverses
Introduction
The COVID-19 global pandemic has shone a light on the precarity of
humanity like nothing else in our recent history – war takes the lives of
the younger people and displaces many, but this virus is noted as an
existential threat to the older as well as the socially and medically
diminished members of society, disrupting global social and health
systems in its wake. Whilst the United Nation’s Sustainable
Development Goals (SDG) were already noted to be under-achieving,
the objectives for 2030 now seem unattainable. This jeopardizes basic
human needs for survival such as food security and health, not least,
because the underpinning assumptions on which the SDGs are based
have been irrevocably changed by the pandemic (Naidoo and Fisher
2020). Indeed, Naidoo and Fisher (2020) argue that if nations were
performing in line with the SDG targets concerned with poverty
elimination, universal health access, and agricultural productivity, the
pandemic would not have been the devasting wrecking-ball as it has
been. What is clear from the environmental research reported to date
is that human proliferation and behavior (over-population, pollution,
deforestation, degradation of land) has put pressure on the natural
balance in our immediate environment and on the planetary
ecosystems as a whole. This has resulted in loss of biodiversity and
climate change.
Some argue that the current pandemic is a ‘moment of truth’ in
our evolution – a time for critical self-reflection and an opportunity for
resolution where less consumption equals more focus on ‘things that
matter’ such as local ecosystems. As Booker prize-winning author
Arundhati Roy states “Historically, pandemics have forced humans to
break with the past and imagine their world anew. This one is no
different. It is a portal, a gateway between one world and the next…”
(Roy 2020; see also Cambefort 2020 and Hong 2020 in MGDR). It is
unsurprising that data released by NASA (National Aeronautics and
Space Administration) and ESA (European Space Agency) intimate the
reduction of pollution as a consequence of the (enforced) lack of
movement of people during the global lockdowns; in the past year, this
reduction has been as much as 30% in some areas such as Wuhan
(China), Italy and Spain (e.g., Rupani et al. 2020). Yet, the pandemic
has also exacerbated our relationship with technologies, especially
information and communications technologies, in the race to ‘get
online’ and ‘stay in touch’ as well as entertain and inform ourselves
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through endless variety of multidimensional virtual platforms. We have
become cyborgs (Haraway 1985; Huang & Rust 2018) – of necessity –
via a transhumanist melding of our bodies and minds with
technologies, without which our now restricted human world would be
significantly diminished.
Attendant to this, we are now witnessing a global shortage of
semiconductors as a consequence of disrupted supplies and increased
demand. Ever this was the trajectory: we have known for some time
that our technology consumption patterns would be unsustainable.
Current chip-based technologies are wholly reliant on the use of a finite
supply of Earth’s resources such as minerals, fossil fuels and Rare
Earth metals, 95% of which are accounted for by Chinese producers
(Vekasi 2019). Furthermore, the numerous attempts by an increasing
number of government-backed public and private organizations to
explore beyond the confines of our planet – the Moon, Mars, Jupiter,
Saturn, Venus and various asteroids and comets – with the aim of
examining potential opportunities for furthering human endeavor has
gained new impetus, albeit this has been planned for years. Indeed,
the pandemic seems to have accelerated not just transhuman and
posthuman trends, but also post-global and extra-global trends (see
the MGDR review of ‘Elysium’; Ulusoy 2020).
We have reached a nexus which places new emphasis on our
understanding of ourselves and our relationship with others – other
nations, other species, other worlds. A critical question is: Does this
mean that our transition into the posthuman is complete? It is therefore
with some interest that I approached the review of Francesca
Ferrando’s book (2019) titled Philosophical Posthumanism.
The next several pages – the major part of this essay – are
devoted to my review of this book, after which I return to my own
commentary on what this book and ongoing research insights reflect on
the emergent, fledgling post-pandemic settings.

Review of Philosophical Posthumanism
Philosophical Posthumanism provides a thought-provoking perspective
on the different theories of how we are posthuman. Its central position
is that humans are entities indelibly interrelated with others, human and
non-human, organic and inorganic, rather than agents acting through
transcendental consciousness. In fact, this monograph is a translation
of a 2016 Italian version of Ferrando’s doctoral thesis, which itself was
awarded the ‘Sainati’ Philosophical Prize by the president of Italy in
2014. Ferrando, it is worth noting, is the first person to have presented
a TED talk on the posthuman in December 2012 and is the founding
director of the New York Posthuman Research Group.
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Amphibian, Rana temporaria [Common British frog]
(image: author copyright)

Her thesis presents two interrelated discourses, organized into
three sections. First, Ferrando presents a critical review of the different
perspectives of the posthuman including terms she argues it now
encompasses such as posthumanism, transhumanism, new
materialism, anti-humanism, object-oriented ontology, posthumanities
and metahumanities. Second, her work extends the field by presenting
new thoughts on ontology, epistemology and ethics in posthumanism.
Third, she acknowledges how human others have evolved and how, in
turn, these influence our understandings of what it means to be posthuman, by answering the question: of which post are we human?
What is interesting is that her take is not a techno-reductionist
perspective but one that explores existential potentials through notions
of a self/other continuum, drawing initially on Foucault and Heidegger
as a means to explore technology and its multifarious relationships with
humans and others. Similarly, her perspective of the human integrates
the many dis-humanizing and anti-humanizing perspectives that have
arisen in recent history, encompassing for example exclusionary
discourse and practices such as sexism, racism, classism, ageism,
homophobia, ableism, etc. By developing her thesis on posthuman
dualities arising as a consequence of hybrid practices with animals,
machines, and non-human others, she raises issues related to bios
(pertaining to human experience) as well as zoë (pertaining to
biological life), touching on historical and biological concepts informed
by Nietzsche (embodied characterization) and Maturana & Varela
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(autopoiesis). She also examines new materialism as a lens,
considering the nature in which the human is networked and
encompassed within a network, drawing on Latour and Deleuze &
Guattari to explore a multiverse perspective on speculative perceptions
of self.
These are all deeply conceptual themes and, as a reader, one is
left with a feeling of having been presented with a delectable
salmagundi or bag of Liquorice AllsortsTM from which to taste a
persuasive preference.

Perspectives
Her review of philosophical perspectives helpfully begins by exploring
the key differences between the posthuman and transhuman, drawing
on a Western philosophical understanding of technological mediation
versus biological enhancement. In discussing post, she argues that
theory is embodied in humanism, enacted by humans and accessed
through an epistemic perspective of feminist self, being both plural and
relational.
Posthumanism is defined as the mediated self and
speculation about possible future human developments as a
consequence of reflecting on what may have been omitted from
human. It is the need to understand what has been omitted that
situates her argument to develop a posthumanist agenda.
Tracing developments in humanism through acceptance of
‘anthropocentrism’, Ferrando discusses notions of other in the human
condition. This essentially links to Braidotti’s (2002) notion of
proliferating differences, placing those others defined by difference at
the margins of society (witches, women, people of colour, disabled,
queer, etc.). It was Hassan (1977) who first discussed posthumanism
in his work on postmodernism, as he explored the possibilities for post
in an inclusive context. Coupling this with development of cybernetic
organisms (e.g., Haraway 1989) in the context of cultural
posthumanism, Ferrando argues that humans become hybrid
animate/mechanized entities, ultimately studied under a breadth of
research themes (transhumanism, antihumanism, metahumanism,
posthumanities, metahumanities, non-human turn, etc.); the
distinctions between which are no longer clear. Ultimately, the term
posthuman captures it all.
Indeed, in attempting to address the question ‘are we already
posthuman?’ it is clear that the answer depends upon the perspective
one takes.
From a transhuman perspective, the answer lays
somewhere between ‘probably just about’ to ‘not quite yet’ (at least
artificial organs such as pacemakers do work); but from a posthuman
perspective, the answer is definitely yes, and we have been since our
prehistoric ancestors first selected a hammerstone over 1.7M years
ago. Of course, more philosophically, Ferrando refers to our
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understanding and deconstruction of other through multiple threads of
discourse in literature, rather than our state of being in the world.
The discussion of transhuman highlights the very real
challenges faced in developing an inclusive position: we are not born
transhuman (until such time as molecular level interventions are
common in the population á la Pearce’s ‘paradise engineering’),
meaning other becomes a significant point of difference as a
consequence of socio-cultural and economic conditions. Thus, glocal
in this context is not a choice: early proponents position it as a form of
Enlightenment emanating from rationality, uncritical of progress
through scientific and technological advancement (More 2003). In this
regard, it is Foucault (1975) that highlighted how philosophy and social
discourse are relationally linked to politics and power, where
technology may be both simultaneously progressive and regressive,
depending on one’s point of interaction. For example, the atomic bomb
may have ended hostilities between the US and Japan, but its
consequences were dire for the Japanese people and profound for the
rest of the World. Similarly, the treatise on rationality has led to
dominance of man, resulting in inequality, discrimination, enslavement
and violence against the other. Furthermore, technological
enhancement commonly associated with the transhuman movement
advocates morphological freedom through bioengineering and selfmodification, often presented as a dualism or separation of mind from
body (‘I think, therefore I am’).
Extending this mind/body separation, Kurzweil’s (2005)
Singularity is seen as an ultimate transcendence of technology over
biology, where the mind overcomes the mortal coil of the flesh body.
Transhumans may thereby somehow project their mind into the body of
an-other, which may be human, machine or object, and live in
perpetuity. Through another perspective or point in time related to a
different socio-cultural evolutionary pattern, however, such separation
may easily be constituted as uncritical, undesirable and self-harmful.
Conversely, Ferrando examines the trajectory of the posthuman
perspective of technology, highlighting it as a non-separate trait
drawing on Heidegger’s praxis. Heidegger’s view of technology was
that it is not simply a means to an end but a manner of revealing or
‘enframing’ some aspect of human condition; hence, it is not the
technology that may cause harm but the human who wields it. She
also draws on Nietzsche’s metamorphoses of the spirit, in which the
human is portrayed as a bridge rather than a purpose, examining the
role of God as a metaphor for authority or mediation in the posthuman
turn. Touching on a number of other philosophical movements (New
Realism, Speculative Realism and Object-Oriented Ontology), she
concludes that whilst posthuman is an umbrella term, it encompasses
challenge to our understanding of the boundaries of what is considered
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to be human. Post being the operative term: she positions
philosophical posthumanism as comprising post-humanism, postanthropocentrism and post-dualism.
Post-humanism refers to
understanding of the plurality of human-kind experiences; postanthropocentrism is the recognition that humans have been
hierarchically privileged over non-humans through the ages; and, postdualism is the way in which self is diametrically symbolized against
other (us/them, friend/enemy, etc.).
Treading a delicate line, Ferrando’s text provides a reassessment of philosophical posthumanism, aligning her work closely
to Braidotti’s key work, The Posthuman (2013). It is the hybridization of
man with other (animal, machine, object) that necessitates an altered
view of the human. This does not contradict previous work on the
posthuman but rather extends our understanding. Braidotti’s work
presents a map of main tenets including post- self, species, death and
theory but, Ferrando argues, does not deal adequately with the
separation between life and death. She states that it is particularly
important to understand where the human is decentred to in order to
make sense of what may be new and different. For example, in
Western study, identity (humanist) is often centred in discourse which
has resulted in ‘radical’ deconstruction of others at the periphery
(women, blacks, queer, etc.). The dualities of hierarchical status that
other implies, however, will always result in discrimination, so in
Ferrando’s view, it is essential that post-dualism (or non-dualism) is
embraced as a decentring tenet. This brings posthumanism closer to
Eastern philosophy, and the ‘profound harmony’ of The Tao (e.g.,
Capra 2010).

Post-humanism
The second part of Ferrando’s book deals with the etymological,
semantic, linguistic and scientific structures and construction of the
term post[-]humanism, particularly in reflecting what human means.
From an etymological standpoint, breaking the term into its constituent
parts, post is a crowded space: post has been employed almost as a
fashion statement, indicating what follows, beyond or after – postcolonialism, post-truth, post-apocalyptic, and so on. Its role is to
communicate the before, in essence emphasizing a trajectory of
development and legitimizing the now. The hyphen too is a victim of
fad, disappearing as terms become more commonplace, hence posthumanism becomes posthumanism. Thus, her focal discussion is on
the humanism part of the term, and its discontents, wherein she
reflects on the nature of other and how this is represented through
different lenses.
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Ferrando argues that other is a necessary yet relational (semantic)
configuration which enables us to make sense of interdependencies
and affinities in the use of the term human. She does this by drawing
particularly on gender theory, using De Beauvoir’s (1949) observance
of how woman is defined in sexual relation to man (‘one is not born, but
rather becomes a woman’ p.301) and Irigaray’s (1974) view of how
woman is simply absent rather than other. In both cases, the concept
of man (and other) becomes ritualized through a process, leading her
to explore the question of how humanizing takes place through
embodiment as a process.
Her thesis is that posthumanism is praxis and thereby highlights
the importance of using non-discriminatory language to explore
process. This is extremely challenging to achieve particularly given
McLuhan’s (1964) ‘medium is message’ truism reflecting the duality of
the what and the how being embedded within cultural artefacts
themselves. Language is tied to culture but when extending this to
include other, say animal, machine or object, the way and how
becomes increasingly complex, multi-layered and multi-dimensional.
Consider, for example, the mathematical code/language of polygons
used to create virtualized humans, the algorithm/language used to
generate routines and behaviours that are embodied in neural
networks, and the storytelling/language embodied within creative
practice such as dance and music.
Understanding the process of humanizing is therefore not a
trivial task. The way she goes about this is by exploring what is
excluded from the notion of the relational human through an analysis of
dehumanization: how slaves, subhumans, nonhumans, monsters,
automata and many other categories of humans at the periphery have
been thought of beyond normalized ideas of man. She then turns this
around by asking what those categories of other humans experience in
the humanizing process. She argues that by doing this, all possible
alternative categories of human are targets for investigation through
the lens of the posthuman.
Another interesting and contemporary reflection Ferrando
makes in this domain is how a posthuman lens provides a relational
overview, not just of the human through biological and geographical
(physical) intra-connections between humans but also of how humans
relate to the planet. She does this by drawing on Teilhard de Chardin’s
paper, ‘From the Pre-Human to the Ultra-Human: The Phases of a
Living Planet’ (1964). This is particularly relevant today in our postCOVID19 anthropocentric world where socio-economic recovery is
interrelated with our ability to create a more sustainable environment.
In many ways this can only really be achieved through a global
overview of the key issues applied to a local context.
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Archaeologically unpacking the term human, Ferrando reflects
on its origins from Greek and Roman times – Greek for human is
anthropos, giving rise to our use of anthropology, anthropocentrism,
etc., but this also originally reflected culture and education. It was for
example Aristotle who defined human as a political being, yet polis
meant civilization and hierarchy within city life (Athens) at the time,
where other was excluded and woman, slave, and non-Greeks were
referred to as barbarian. Thus, the term human relates to culture,
reason and civilization. In this context, Ferrando traces how the word is
adopted by early playwrights but, in so doing, argues that it was mainly
developed by free male intellectuals rather than including peripheral
categories of human. This again is therefore exclusionary and positions
the posthuman as a necessary development for progression, even
though the term humanity is an attempt to reflect inclusivity in its
broadest sense.
From a scientific standpoint, Ferrando positions her discussion
in the context of speciesism and the system of biological classification
developed by Linnaeus (1758), where Homo sapiens was determined
as a category of mammal (familia primate) defined by differentiating
characteristics (genus, familia, ordo, etc.). Linnaeus’ Homo sapiens
(referring to genus and species) also included a taxonomy of five
groupings based on race (continent, skin colour and other defining
features) as well as a monstrous taxon which dealt with outliers such
as those with congenital disformities (dwarf, giant, other birth defects).
This classification was based on a Eurocentric perspective which still
informs our construction of human and within species differentiation
today, not least because the methodology was configured by Western
human endeavour. Following this line and situating the primacy of
(Western) human, for example, Agamben (2002) argued that to be
human, one must recognize oneself as human and, of course, this
becomes problematic when considering different races classify
themselves in different ways, such as according to cultural practices
(eg., indigenous tribes). Ferrando argues that posthuman therefore
destabilises Linnaeus’ classification, which is actually based on his
strict Lutheran upbringing as much as it is scientific praxis, wherein
woman nurtures (ordo of mammal derives from mammalia, meaning
breast, a term coined by Linnaeus) and man engages in intellectual
activities.
In conclusion, the term human in posthumanism is not neutral
but imbued with socio-political, economic and symbolic meaning that
predetermines potential for exclusivity rather than inclusivity of other.
Ferrando highlights the importance of recognizing these deficiencies in
our use of the language and, through it, sets the scene for developing
the field of philosophical posthumanism.
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Post Posthuman
The final section of Ferrando’s text develops her thesis on
philosophical posthumanism simply by asking what follows the
anthropocene. As well as situating her discussion within a geologicalchronological discourse drawing on Latour she also shapes this by
drawing on Haraway’s ‘response-ability’ (2017) for shaping the Earth.
Her approach is by way of asking how the anthropocene has been
contested, highlighting Parikka’s (2014) anthrobscene (the obscenities
of media ecologies), Moore’s (2016) capitalocene (profit-based) and
Haraway’s (2016) chthulucene (where human and non-human are
inextricably linked in tentacular practices). She argues it is high time
for a paradigm shift and does not much mind whether that is termed
post-humanism, post-anthropocentrism or post-dualism.
This is probably because Ferrando’s argument centres on Gaia
theory as a ‘cosmic embodiment that cannot be silenced’. Gaia theory
connotes the interdependencies between all components of Earth,
such as biological and geological structures. Drawing on Stengers
(2015) and Latour (2017), she makes a compelling argument that there
is no future in which man will thrive by ignoring Gaia, albeit this theory
subverts the trajectory of human Enlightenment. As she notes,
however, man cannot simply be removed and even though the
posthuman is a clear means by which to question the intraconnections, ultimately even dead man in its bare form impacts Earth
(as compost).
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Rob’s Open Source Android, ROSA, built by Knight (2016), photographed on display
at the Science Museum’s Robots: 500-Year Quest to Make Machines Human
exhibition, 2017
(image: author copyright)

It is at this juncture that she creates an interesting link to the
transhuman perspective, where life and death co-exist in a
continuously evolving cycle of re-generation at both micro and macro
levels (e.g., cellular and body). If human life can be extended ad
infinitum (Kurzweil), how relevant is this dichotomy within a posthuman
turn? This leads her to question what is posthuman life, again engaging
the reader with etymological and scientific perspectives. Using the
origins of Greek terms, she differentiates between bios (pertaining to
man) and zoë (pertaining to all life), both of which are also sociopolitically derived. She argues life is particularly difficult to define (e.g.,
virus is neither alive nor dead) and instead asks the question of the
relativity of life to death as meaningful for understanding
posthumanism. Through this, animism is a term that is forwarded. As
Ferrando states, however, whilst grounded in Eastern philosophy
(Shintoism), the term animism is useful as a transcultural (rather than
Western
hegemonic)
perspective
yet
the
dichotomy
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(animate/inanimate) remains and is not particularly useful in
understanding technologically advanced posthuman life. Mori’s (1970)
uncanny valley effect, for example, illustrates how inanimate robots
may be perceived as animate and/or spiritual beings (Mori 1974) in
many cultural contexts. By way of example, the robot (Knight 2016)
image above illustrates an anthropomorphic representation, but the
particular robot identified was also programmed to move like a human
which animates it.
The robot/human discourse also results in otherness and
consequential discrimination (e.g., anti-autonomous agents movement)
and so Ferrando argues that philosophical posthumanism must
consider the symbioses between human and other. This becomes
particularly relevant in a technology context, where liveness of say a
robot is a current hot topic in a number of fields including arts,
humanities as well as science and technology. Ferrando approaches
the question by asking how life can be artificial, drawing on Langton’s
(1986) notion of cellular automata as a means to interrogate why it is
necessary to consider a machine as organic for it to be alive. Life
according to Langton is an abstraction of logical form emanating from
molecular level code (e.g., DNA strings), his argument being that if it is
simply code that determines life, then artificially codified life is possible.
Ferrando then extends her discussion by considering the nature of
virtual disembodiment as an illustration of logical form, taking
Warwick’s (2012) and others’ position that it is preferable to have
biological embodiment in order that a cybernetic organism may fully
understand its physical environment and be persistently aware.
Having turned this around to advance her thesis, therefore,
Ferrando argues that a view of biological AI is a necessary perspective
(again overcoming the dualism of organic/inorganic) to position
Channell’s (1991) worldview of the future roles of genetics, quantum
physics and super-intelligence. She is quick to address the issue that
such a perspective positions philosophical posthumanism as
technocentric, arguing that by addressing the animate/inanimate
dualism, the approach neither excludes nor places hierarchies on
other. Instead, the new discourse decentres the debate around
primacy of one over another and allows for a broader discourse
encompassing diversity and sustainability.
The ability to do this is predicated on her argument around a
common ancestor – a primordial single cell from which all life on Earth
is believed to have begun, drawing on Lamarck’s (1809) transformism
where characteristics are inherited between generations, Darwin’s
(1852) On the origin of species by means of natural selection and
Woese’s (1998) argument that a universal origin is a process that
connotes gene transfer across a community of cells which combine
and recombine into organisms through evolution.
Evolution is
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evidenced in the general ability to interbreed between species (of
course there are exceptions) and as such there are likely to be no fixed
boundaries as implied by Linnaeus’ classification system. Evolution is
therefore a natural-cultural continuous process notwithstanding that
eugenics (selection for desirable traits) and epigenetics (the influence
of nurture) have resulted in undesirable aspects such as primacy and
exploitation (e.g., racism, ableism and genocide). Ferrando uses
Shiva’s (1995) counter-argument against genetic modification as an
example of perverse yet inevitable post-anthropocentrism which raises
political, economic, social and ethical issues. Artificial selection is a
posthumanities worldview because it opens the discourse to both
posthumanist and transhumanist perspectives.
Focussing on a bioethical perspective of technological
enhancement, philosophical posthumanism raises many questions not
so much related to the whether it is possible and what comes after, but
more whether it should be allowed in the first instance. This is not just
about the human condition but about the role of human in other.
Ferrando’s discussion centres on the precautionary versus
proactionary principle, posited by More (2004). The precautionary
standpoint describes a legal/illegal dichotomy for the transhuman
based on the potential for creating disparity and discrimination. The
proactionary standpoint is about dealing with the consequences as
they arise but by fundamentally recognizing the freedom [of people] to
influence their own evolution. Technological enhancement, by its very
nature, brings into question the roles of others – who has control over
the technology, what happens to the data it generates, etc. giving rise
therefore to further socio-political considerations. For example,
Ferrando discusses intervention at the molecular level to enhance
human life prospect (removing the likelihood of contracting life limiting
conditions such as cancers and diseases from our genetic code) but
perhaps, taking her Gaia argument forward, that intervention might
view the prospect of reproductive rates of one decentred entity, without
hierarchical primacy, to balance and sustain planetary conditions
thereby reducing human lifespan or tolerance to natural conditions.
Her posthuman perspective of technological advancement is therefore
incomplete and avoids some of the thorny discourses that exist today
around global sustainability and the posthuman, albeit she does revisit
this later in the text.
Drawing on Maturana & Varela (1972/1980) to further explore
the notion of life and its role in the posthuman, Ferrando turns to the
issue of self-sustaining life (autopoiesis) as a cognitive process. She
reflects on Haraway’s (2017) view that nothing is really capable of selforganizing, preferring instead to use the term sympoiesis to describe a
relational process. Cognition is a scientific construction of knowledge,
whereas epistemology is a philosophical approach (the actual process
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versus the how it happens). To illustrate her point, she uses an
example of the frog: observed by Maturana and others, the eye of the
creature only recognizes food when it behaves like food, a moving
insect say, whereas if food around it did not move it would starve. This
indicates a species-specific organization of language. Her point is
made in the context of understanding ethics of human experimentation
on animal other and its role as a methodology for the posthuman,
where such experimentation is largely justified and undertaken as a
methodology of human advancement (over other).
She extends the point to assess life of the robot, drawing on
Turing’s (1950) groundbreaking work to argue that if a machine acts
intelligently then perhaps it is and the posthuman is thereby about
perspectivism. Thus, the human-centric fear of a potential existential
threat from artificial intelligence would be replaced with a plurality of
embodiment. To further her discussion, she aligns Nietzsche’s view of
perspectivism on which posthumanism draws heavily. Nietzsche (1901)
stated that there are no absolute truths, only interpretations. It is the
interplay of different interpretations and situated standpoints that
provides the basis of a plurality of understanding about the posthuman.
Albeit his examination of this was from an acknowledged human
standpoint, he was aware of, and did not rule out, other in his
discourse. Ferrando argues this is consistent with Braidotti’s notion of
embodiment (of mind), which rather than being separated as
mind/body, recognizes the ‘embrainment’ of body. This is in tune with
the discourse that the body does not have to be biological (e.g., Barad,
2007) which allows Ferrando to discuss alternative embodiments such
as avatars and shamanism.
Ferrando also engages in a discussion of matter and its
relationship to other, enabling her to critique Object Oriented Ontology
(OOO) (e.g., Harman 2015). She states that although there are
common elements, the central thesis of OOO gives primacy to other
over human, which diverges with a dualistic standpoint of philosophical
posthumanism. The argument centres on the relevancy of matter,
through which Ferrando interestingly explores string theory. From
physics, string theory (different to particle physics) is the view that all
subatomic matter is a vibrating, uni-dimensional string of energy, which
gives rise to particles based on the characteristics of the vibration,
which in turn is relational to other strings (Randall 2005). As a theory of
quantum physics, the vibration of a string is said to produce a graviton
resulting in gravitational force. String theory is therefore an
underpinning theory that incorporates all fundamental interactions of
the universe. Ferrando suggests posthumanism is consistent with
string theory because it aligns with the deconstructed/reconstructed
post-dualistic approach. This premise of philosophical posthumanism
thereby provides the basis for some very interesting future prospects
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such as the multiverse, where the current space-time continuum may
be only one materialized dimension of many possible alternatives.

Eric and box
(image: Katie Page, used with permission)

The final part of her thesis is therefore about the possibilities of
the multiverse as a philosophical tenet of posthumanism. This is a bold
concept to say the least, and draws on different theories including
physicist Schrödinger’s famous cat thought experiment to explain how
quantum mechanics may be applied to pragmatic scenarios. The
multiverse theory still highlights dichotomies: here/there, this
world/other worlds, this universe/other universes – ‘there’ being the
most distant and unreachable prospect of human imagination which
Ferrando argues would benefit from post-humanist, postanthropocentric and post-dualistic reflection. Her treatment of this is
not trivial. She examines the concept through a philosophical
construction of a posthuman multiverse using a relational perspective
by describing a ripple effect of vibrating strings. In such a way, she
argues that strings are intra-linked, resulting in or ‘revealing’
(Heidegger) nodes in a material network. To explain her thoughts
further, she uses the metaphor of a rhizome as a possible source of
expansion of multiverse theory where any part of the root (think ginger
or dahlia or the hyperlinked internet) can spur a new root, resulting in
an intra-connected non-hierarchical structure, drawing on Deleuze &
Guattari (1987). Ultimately, Ferrando emphasizes that her argument is
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a position on posthumanist ontological existentialism which, by being
both monistic and pluralistic, is post-dualistic.
In conclusion, the text is a foray into a broad range of
perspectives that enable the author to critique and position
philosophical posthumanism. She situates her work in both humanism
and anthropocentrism and destabilises the centricity of the human from
other in the process.
Whilst ending at a largely untestable
philosophical point, the multiverse theory, her means of arguing for a
more sustainable or balanced approach as a posthuman is compelling
and potentially provides an interesting lens through which researchers
could in future deconstruct and explore global and local markets.

Reflections on the Post-Pandemic Worlds
Where Ferrando’s text highlights the issues around resolving the
dualism of other in order to improve the relationships between
humanity and our environment, COVID-19 has highlighted the
imperative for doing so. We may well be posthuman from a range of
perspectives, but we are certainly not post-dualistic. The economicallyderived ecosystem through which humanity perceives its environment
remains an existential threat in a post-pandemic world (e.g., Dholakia &
Atik 2020).
The pandemic has brought to the fore of our consciousness
some of the most profound challenges faced in resolving how we
acknowledge human other, especially at the margins of hegemonic
techno-scientific endeavors through which vaccines have been
developed and deployed, and communities pacified. For example,
whereas a local response has been to target older and weaker
members of communities, the global response has been based on
nationalism, education and access to healthcare systems. Other in this
case are those peoples whose lives are shaped by poverty, communal
drift and exclusion. Yet without addressing the dualism in humanity
surely environmental challenges faced as a consequence of divergent
consumption practices can never be balanced.
All species, including humans, are hard-wired to survive and
dominate over territories (Darwin 1859; and other evolution theorists),
which of necessity pits the self against some other and its environment.
At best, this could be described as an harmonious ecosystem, and at
worst, a parasitic relationship. The current posthuman challenge is
therefore not to resolve the dualism but to find a survivable balance for
optimal longevity, recognizing the wider socio-techno-environmental
ecosystem in which humans exist with its finite yet evolving others in
what Latour and Weibel (2020) refer to as the critical zone of material
Earth – that thin habitable region between the Earth’s outer crust and
space which does not exist elsewhere in the known cosmos. Afterall,
neither humans nor others have anywhere else to go.
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Alas, to calculate such planetary balance is beyond even our
most advanced computational and scientific capabilities at present
which further serves to highlight the precarity of humanity and the
strength or survivability of Gaia, depending on whether one’s
perspective is as an active or passive interrelationship. Either way,
what is optimal in such a context? Who knows, but more importantly
why should humans care? Ultimately, this is a function of basic human
need, possibly redefined as perceived quality of co-existence. Such
‘need’ underpins the ethos of the United Nations’ Sustainable
Development Goals, but if our post-pandemic world is to achieve
relational balance, then the United Nations must include all nations and
representation of all peoples with the best science we can bring to bear
on each and every issue. Today’s posthuman, reflecting in Ferrando’s
terms, is frankly still clearly centering the human over non-human
others. This is as much about equality in consumption as it is about
environmental sustainability. It was only in 2009, for example, that a
few predominantly European countries recognized the sentience of
animals in its policies, albeit this primarily relates to their treatment in
the food chain and only then in the event that policies exist within
countries to protect them as ‘not things’ (e.g., Hudson 2019). This goes
no further therefore than positioning humans as lip-servants to
saviorism.
So, what about markets in the posthuman post-pandemic world?
At its heart, a market is an anthropocentric exchange-based microecosystem. This has some merit in achieving a foundation of balance
among humans and possibly a limited number of other species (pets)
through a process of virtuous [re-]distribution – what is of value to one
may well be of little value to another, and so on. It also is the premise
of social enterprises and technology enabled platforms which have
become sharing-based economies and digitized commons (e.g., Kwet
2020). These emergent rhizomic markets are, however, not viable
without policies that underpin the provision of basic needs for human
survivability, which in turn implies a means to legitimize a universal
value derived from exchange – the wicked problem that emerges of
course is always about whose value the exchange is pegged against.
Thus, for a socialist environment to prevail, a complete overhaul of
existing market concepts and structures is required, yet how this could
be realized in our globalized hyper-connected environment (Hong
2020) is far from clear.
What is interesting in the context of connectivity, however, is
that it is not just humans that are connected. There are now
innumerable animate, inanimate, organic and inorganic entities which
are connected through a vast web using cloud, edge and satellite
computing technologies to derive insight for those educated in
assimilating and reading the language of digitized data and code
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(known as the ‘Internet of All Things’). Others with such skills may not
be human but machine, or a network of machines, where intelligence is
the currency of exchange. It may be that by working relationally with
machines, as hypothesized by Lovelock (2019) in his thesis setting out
a post-anthropocentric world, the fundamental need to find and support
balance and harmony is achievable.
Such ‘intelligent’ machines would act as translators between
humans and others effectively becoming a post-dualistic binding organ.
As we have seen with the numerous dark web incursions on markets
over the past months and for years by various state-operating
organizations, however, when the data-based environment is not
regulated with a global value system derived from equality, chaos
ensues. Our relationship with ‘intelligent’ machines has therefore not
begun well with power having slipped into the hands of a few selfinterested entities but perhaps it is not too late to address the
problems. Certainly, the environment is filled with complementary
empathic drive which creates a much-needed groundswell, what
Haraway (2017) refers to as sympoiesis. It is ‘simply’ that the binding
techno-organ has not yet learned to bind.

Concluding Observations
This Dialogue contribution, substantially through a review of Francesca
Ferrando’s (2019) book entitled Philosophical Posthumanism, has
explored the nexus which we find ourselves at as a consequence of the
COVID-19 pandemic. Ferrando’s thesis helps us to assess the
precariousness of our humanity by developing our understanding of
ourselves and our relationship with others – other nations, other
species, other worlds. Through analysis, it becomes evident that whilst
we are posthuman through a multitude of different lenses, our transition
is incomplete – the notion of other creates many challenges in our
current market-based ecosystem and the dualism in us-other contexts
prevails. Whilst it is clear that becoming cyborg through pandemic
pressure has further exacerbated the unbalanced nature of our
relationship with our environment, technology may yet be the binding
organ that helps us reconfigure globalized markets to achieve equality
and balance for a sustainable environment.
This will need more speculative research at a metaversal level,
combining virtual and physical environments and entities to develop
new concepts in order to evaluate potential impacts on socio-technoenvironmental ecosystems.
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